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There is a widespread sense that over the last 
two decades firms have been decentralizing 
decisions to employees further down the mana-
gerial hierarchy. Economists have developed 
a range of theories to account for delegation, 
but there is less empirical evidence, especially 
across countries. This has limited the ability to 
understand the phenomenon of decentraliza-
tion. To address this empirical lacuna we have 
developed a research program to measure the 
internal organization of firms—including their 
decentralization decisions—across a large range 
of industries and countries.
In this paper we investigate whether greater 
product market competition increases decen-
tralization. For example, tougher competition 
may make local managers’ information more 
valuable, as delays to decisions become more 
costly. Since globalization and liberalization 
have increased the competitiveness of product 
markets, one explanation for the trend towards 
decentralization could be increased competi-
tion. Of course there are a range of other fac-
tors that may also be at play, including human 
capital (Eve Caroli and John Van Reenen 2001), 
information and communication technology (Timothy Bresnahan, Erik Brynjolfsson, and 
Lorin Hitt 2002), culture (Bloom, Sadun, and 
Van Reenen 2009), and industrial composition.
To tackle these issues we collected detailed 
information on the internal organization of firms 
across nations. The few datasets that exist are 
either from a single industry1 or (at best) across 
1 For example, Luis Garicano and Tom Hubbard (2007) 
on legal services.
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many firms in a single country.2 We  analyze 
data on almost 4,000 firms across 12 countries 
in Europe, North America and Asia. We find 
that competition does indeed seem to foster 
greater decentralization.
I.  Some Theories
A number of papers such as Philippe Aghion 
and Jean Tirole (1997), George Baker, Robert 
Gibbons, and Kevin Murphy (1999), Canice 
Prendergast (2002), and Oliver Hart and John 
Moore (2004), consider the delegation decision 
in the context of an information-based approach. 
For example, Acemoglu et al. (2007) examine a 
model where a firm faces a choice over whether 
to adopt a new technology. The principal is the 
Central Head Quarters (CHQ) and the agent is 
the plant manager. The CHQ has a greater inter-
est in maximizing the firm’s value than the man-
ager, but the manager has greater local private 
knowledge than the CHQ. Characteristics of the 
environment that increase: (i) the value of local 
information; and (ii) the congruence of incen-
tives between the CHQ and plant manager, will 
increase decentralization.
How does competition affect this trade-off? 
There are several reasons to expect the relation-
ship between competition and decentralization 
to be positive. First, if competition reduces the 
agency problem, then delegation is more likely 
as incentives are more aligned. This could be 
because (i) managers work harder to avoid 
bankruptcy; (ii) competition fosters a greater 
sensitivity of profits to relative differences 
in managerial effort, or (iii) if there are more 
2 See, for example, Daron Acemoglu et al. (2007) for 
France and the United Kingdom; Massimo Colombo and 
Marco Delmastro (2004) and Jakub Kastl, David Martimort 
and Salvatore Piccolo (2008) for Italy. The paper closest to 
ours is Maria Guadalupe and Julie Wulf (forthcoming) who 
use panel data for the United States and a trade liberaliza-
tion to identify a postive causal impact of competition on 
firm delayering.
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firms then it is easier to implement yardstick 
competition.
Ricardo Alonso, Wouter Dessein, and Niko 
Matouschek (2009) emphasize the incentive to 
centralize to overcome within-firm spillovers. For 
example, when a firm has two plants selling sepa-
rate substitutable products, local plant managers 
will tend to set a price that is too low from the 
firm’s perspective, as the cannibalization effect is 
not internalized. Tougher competition will make 
the loss from this cannibalization smaller though, 
as price cost margins fall. So long as there is some 
incentive to delegate because of local information 
advantages, the incentive to decentralize rises as 
competition increases.
There are also competitive forces working 
against decentralization. On the incentives/
agency side, greater competition may actually 
reduce managerial effort, as smaller mark-
ups mean that the incentive to exert greater 
managerial effort to raise firm profitability is 
blunted. This is a variety of the well-known 
“Schumpeterian” effect on innovation—lower 
quasi-rents reduce incentives to take activities 
that lower marginal costs. On the information 
side, if competition increases the number of 
firms, then there will be more public informa-
tion, so in the Acemoglu et al. (2007) model the 
principal can learn from observing other firms 
and take more decisions directly.
Ultimately, the effect of competition on 
decentralization is an empirical issue. To look at 
this question using our organizational data, we 
estimate models of the form:
(1)  Dijc  =  βCOMPijc + δ′xijc + uijc
where D and COMP are indicators for decen-
tralization and product market competition for 
plant i in industry j in country c, x is a vector of 
other controls (including country and industry 
dummies) and uijc is an error term.
II.  Data
We collected data on almost 4,000 medium 
sized (100 to 5,000 employees) manufacturing 
firms across a dozen countries, which we briefly 
describe here.
A. Measuring Decentralization
We investigated the decentralization of deci-
sion making from the CEO to the plant manager. 
The plant manager is the most senior person 
at the factory level, so his autonomy from the 
CEO, who is typically based in the corporate 
headquarters, is a natural measure of decentral-
ization. To quantify this we measured decentral-
ization along four dimensions. First, how much 
capital investment could a plant manager under-
take without prior authorization from the cor-
porate headquarters? Second, how much control 
does the plant manager have in hiring a new full-
time permanent shop-floor employee? Third, 
how much control does the plant manager have 
over introducing new products? Fourth, how 
much control does the manager have over sales 
and marketing decisions? These last three mea-
sures were scaled from a score of one, defined 
as all decisions taken at the corporate headquar-
ters, to a five defined as all decisions taken at the 
plant (decentralization). Since the scaling may 
vary across all these questions, we converted 
all four measures to z-scores (mean zero, unit 
standard deviation) and in our baseline took the 
average of the four z-scores. We also collected 
information on management practices (follow-
ing Bloom and Van Reenen 2007), the propor-
tion of employees with college degrees, the 
average hours worked and the gender and age 
breakdown. From the sample database we also 
have information for most firms on accounting 
variables like sales and the capital stock.
B. Collecting Accurate Responses
To obtain truthful responses we took a number 
of steps. First, the survey was conducted by tele-
phone without telling the managers they were 
being scored on organizational practices. This 
enabled scoring to be based on the interviewer’s 
evaluation of the firm’s actual practices, rather 
than its aspirations, the manager’s perceptions 
or the interviewer’s impressions. To run this 
“blind” scoring we used open questions (i.e., “To 
hire a full-time permanent shop-floor worker 
what agreement would your plant need from 
corporate headquarters?”), rather than closed 
questions (i.e., “Can you hire workers without 
authority from corporate headquarters?” [yes/
no]). Following the initial question the discus-
sion would continue until the interviewer can 
make an accurate assessment of the firm’s typi-
cal practices. For example, if the plant manager 
responded “It is my decision, but I need sign-off 
from corporate HQ,” the interviewer would ask 
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“How often would sign-off typically be given?” 
and “Can you give me any examples when that 
sign-off has not been given?” Second, the inter-
viewers were not told anything about the firm’s 
financial information or performance in advance 
of the interview. Since the firms (the median size 
270 employees) are too small to attract much 
media coverage, this should mean the interview-
ers had no preconceptions about the firms before 
they interviewed them. Third, each interviewer 
ran 85 interviews on average, allowing us to 
remove interviewer fixed effects. Fourth, the 
survey instrument was targeted at plant man-
agers, who are typically senior enough to have 
an overview of organizational practices but not 
so senior as to be detached from day-to-day 
operations. Fifth, we collected a detailed set of 
information on the interview process itself (e.g., 
local time of day), the manager (e.g., national-
ity), and on the interviewer. These survey met-
rics are used as “noise controls” to help reduce 
residual variation. Finally, to maximize compa-
rability every interviewer also had the same ini-
tial three days of interview training to ensure a 
common interpretation of the scoring grid. The 
team operated from one location and interview-
ers surveyed firms across multiple countries, so 
for example, an English and French speaking 
interviewer would interview firms in France, the 
United Kingdom and the United States.
C. Descriptive Statistics
Intriguingly, we found that firms in devel-
oping countries (Brazil, China, and India), 
tended to be the most centralized, with almost 
all major decisions taken by the owners in the 
corporate headquarters (see Bloom, Sadun, 
and Van Reenen 2009). Japanese firms were 
also relatively centralized. In contrast, firms 
in Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian countries (Canada, Germany, Sweden, United Kingdom, 
and United States) were relatively decentral-
ized. The rest of Europe (e.g., France, Italy, and 
Poland) tended to be in the middle of the decen-
tralization ranking.
III.  Results
Table 1 examines the association between 
decentralization and different measures of prod-
uct market competition, revealing a robustly 
 positive relationship. We use three different 
proxies for product market competition follow-
ing Steve Nickell (1996) and Philippe Aghion et 
al. (2005).
The first measure is the degree of import 
penetration in the country by two-digit indus-
try measured as the share of total imports over 
domestic production. This is constructed for 
the five-year period 1999–2003 to remove any 
potential contemporaneous feedback. The sec-
ond is the country by three-digit industry Lerner 
index of competition, which is (1 − profits/
sales), calculated as the average across the entire 
firm level database (excluding the firms in the 
survey). Again, this is constructed for the five-
year period 2000–2004 to remove any potential 
contemporaneous feedback.3 The third measure 
of competition is the manager’s response to the 
survey question on the number of competitors a 
firm faces, valued zero for “no competitors,” one 
for “between one and five competitors,” and two 
for “five or more competitors.” 
Reassuringly, whichever measure of competi-
tion we use, we still find a very strong and robust 
relationship between more competition and 
greater levels of decentralization. In column 1, 
higher import competition is positively and sig-
nificantly associated with greater decentraliza-
tion. In column 2 we include controls for skills, 
size, multinational status, country dummies 
and three-digit industry dummies and find this 
result appears to be robust to these additional 
explanatory variables. In terms of these other 
covariates, we find that larger firms and plants, 
especially those belonging to foreign multina-
tionals, are more likely to delegate, potentially 
because of greater operational complexity and 
the importance of local knowledge. Plants with 
higher levels of human capital are more likely 
to be autonomous, presumably because more 
educated employees are better able to effec-
tively run their own plants. Finally, in other 
recent work we have found that plants located 
in regions with higher trust and less hierarchical 
religions are also likely to be autonomous (see 
Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen 2009, for more 
analysis of these cultural issues).4
3 The difference in timing between the import penetra-
tion measure and the Lerner index is due to the fact that 
the accounting data is available until 2004 but the OECD 
import competition data is available only until 2003.
4 In this specification all competition results in Table 1 
are robust to the inclusion of trust and hierarchical religion 
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In columns 3 and 4 we run an identical spec-
ification, but instead use the lagged industry-
level (inverse) Lerner index as an alternative 
measure of competition. We again find a sig-
nificant and positive association between com-
petition and decentralization without and with 
the full set of controls. Finally, in columns 
5 and 6 we run another similar specification 
using the plant manager’s own self-reported 
measure of the perceived number of competi-
tors. Again we find a positive and significant 
association with and without the full set of 
controls. This reveals that the more rivals a 
firm perceives it faces, the more decentralized 
it appears to be. 
In summary, we find a highly significant and 
robust relationship between more competition 
and greater firm-level decentralization. The 
controls. With these included, the coefficients (standard 
errors) of the competition variables are 0.154 (0.067), 2.920 
(1.119), and 0.099 (0.031) in columns 2, 4, and 6 respec-
tively. Similarly, the results are robust to the inclusion of 
a summary management measure (see Bloom and Van 
Reenen 2007 for details). In this specification the coef-
ficients (standard errors) of the competition variables are 
0.173 (0.073), 1.591 (0.872), and 0.067 (0.034) in columns 
2, 4, and 6 respectively.
magnitude of these competition effects is also 
of economic as well as statistical significance. 
For example, in column 6 increasing the num-
ber of competitors from zero to five is associated 
with an increase in the decentralization index of 
about 0.2, equivalent to going from a relatively 
decentralized European country like Germany 
to a very decentralized country like the United 
States.
IV.  Conclusions
We have addressed the question of whether 
competition fosters delegation by assembling 
a new dataset on about 4,000 firms across 
12 countries that measures the delegation of 
authority from Central Head Quarters to local 
plant managers. We find that competition is 
associated with a greater degree of delega-
tion. This suggests that one of the reasons for 
the move towards decentralization over time 
in the developed countries may be increasing 
competition, possibly arising from more glo-
balized product markets. It also implies that 
a reason for the greater centralization in less 
developed countries may be lower competitive 
intensity.
Table 1—Competition and Decentralization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Import penetration 0.131** 0.183**
  (3 years lagged) (0.050) (0.073)
Lerner competition index 5.705** 1.763**
  (2 years lagged) (0.850) (0.878)
Number of competitors 0.120** 0.093**
  (0 = “None”, 1 = “1 to 4”; 2 = “5+”) (0.035) (0.034)
Plant skills 0.080** 0.082** 0.083**
 Percent employees with a college degree (0.018) (0.017) (0.016)
Firm size 0.081** 0.068** 0.066**
 Ln(firm employment) (0.027) (0.019) (0.018)
Plant employment 0.125** 0.088** 0.086**
 Ln(Plant employees as a % of firm employment) (0.023) (0.024) (0.022)
Foreign multinational 0.131** 0.106** 0.115**
 Firm belongs to a foreign multinational (0.048) (0.041) (0.042)
Observations 2,508 2,508 3,698 3,698 3,698 3,698
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: OLS estimates. The dependent variable is the decentralization z-score index. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
clustered at the same level as the competition measure. Controls include a dummy for a public listing, being an affiliate of a 
domestic multinational, country and 3-digit industry controls, and a full set of survey noise controls: interviewer dummies, 
interviewee controls, and time of day and week (see Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen 2009).
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
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